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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a deprivation of parental rights case
which originated in the Juvenile Court.

The biological

parents now seek a reversal of the order of the Juvenile
Court with regard to the termination of all their parental rights.
DISPOSITION IN LOHER COURT
The Juvenile Courtentered an order placing the minor
child, Carol, in foster care and denying the petition
for permanent deprivation.

The Juvenile Court ordered

that Rose be placed for adoption, but afforded her the
right to visit with her biological parents as desired.
Hith regard to Harold and Dollie, the order permanently
deprived the parents of all rights and ordered that
these two children be placed for adoption.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants do not dispute the order with regard
to Carol.

They do seek the reversal of the order

placing Rose, Harold and Dollie for adoption, and in
the alternative modifying the order with regard to
Harold and Dollie to permit these children to have
contact with their biological parents.

-lSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Viewing the record in a light favoring the
successful party below, the evidence demonstrates
the following:
l.

The State filed a petition seeking permanent

deprivation of all parental rights with regard to
four children, Carol, Rose, Harold and Dollie.
2.

At a hearing on March 8, 1977, the State

moved to amend its petition and made an oral motion
for psychological examinations of the parents, to
which counsel for the parents objected.
3.

On March 17, 1977, a pre-trial was held

and new counsel for the parents objected to the
re-newed oral motion for psychologicals

except as

it related to the completion of the previous testing
already commenced by Dr. Tomb.

A minute entry for

March 17, 1977 indicated that the Court ordered Dr.
Tomb to finish his psychological examination of the
parents and the Court was to send a letter requesting
the same to Dr. Tomb.
4.

In April of 1977, Dr. Liebroder administered

psychological tests to the parents and in May of 1977,
0r. Berensen administered psychological tests to the
J2I~~ts.

Both of these tests were, apparently, conducted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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at the request of Judge Whitmer.

There is no record

of the same however.
5.

The Court made no findings that the physical,

mental or emotional condition of the parents may be
a factor in causing the neglect, dependency or delinquency of the children before ordering the psychologicals.
6.

There was no notice of a hearing for the

purpose of obtaining an order from the Juvenile Court
that the parents submit to a psychological examination,
nor was their due notice and hearing set for this
specific purpose.
7.

Following a lengthy

trial, the Juvenile

Court entered an order, granting a motion to dismiss
the petition for permanent deprivation with regard
to Carol and continuing her placement in temporary
foster care.

The Court, further,

entered an order

terminating all parental rights with regard to Rose,
but in an effort to maintain a contact with her
heritage, permitted her to visit with her parents
as desired.
8.

The Court also entered an order terminating

all parental rights with regard to Harold and Doliie
and ordering that they be placed for adoption.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATIONS
WHICH WERE ADMINISTERED WITHOUT DUE NOTICE AND A
HEARING SET FOR THIS SPECIFIC PURPOSE AND OVER THE
OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS, ARE
INVALID,

&~D

SINCE THEY WERE THE

~~IN

BASIS FOR THE

ORDER OF PERMANENT DEPRIVATION, THE ORDER PERMANENTLY
DEPRIVING THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS OF THEIR CHILDREN
SHOULD BE VACATED.
In 78-Ja-23, U.C.A. annotated as amended, the
legislature set forth the following guidelines
with regard to a psychological or psychiatric
examination of parents:
After due notice and a hearing set for the
specific purpose, the Court may order a similar
examination of a parent or guardian whose ability
to care for a child is an issue, if the Court
finds from the evidence presented at the hearing
that the par~or guardian's physical, mental,
or emotional condition may be a factor in
causing the neglect, dependency, or delinquency
of the child.
In the instant case there was a hearing on March
8, 1977, during which the state moved to amend its petition
for permanent deprivation, and counsel for the state made
an oral motion for psychological examinations of the
?arents.

Johnathan King, counsel for the parents
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 4-

objected on the basis that the parents had already been
examined by a Dr. Tomb in connection with another child,
in another matter, and the Court observed that it would
not make a decision at that time because counsel for
the parents believed he had a conflict of interest.
On March 17, 1977 a pre-trial was held and
Patricia De Michele, new counsel for the parents
objected to the re-newed oral motion for psychologicals
except as it related to the completion of the previous
testing already commenced by Dr. Tomb.
The Court made no findings that the physical,
mental or emotional condition of the parents may be
a factor in causing the neglect, dependency or
delinquency of the children.

But, apparently, as

the record is silent in this area, the Court sent a
letter to Dr. Liebroder and Dr. Berensen requesting
that they test the parents in connection with the case
in question.
In April of 1977, Dr. Liebroder administered
tests to the parents and in May of 1977, Dr. Berensen
tested the parents.

Both of these tests Nere conducted

at the req·-1est of Judge 1Jhitmer.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
' may contain errors.
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There is no indication in the file, of any kind,
that due notice of a hearing for the purpose of
obtaining an examination of the parents was ever
submitted to the parents, or to counsel for the
parents.

Further, there is no indication that a hearing

was set for the specific purpose of obtaining
a psychological or psychiatric examination of the parents;
and finally, there is no evidence of any kind in the
record that the Court ever made a finding from evidence
presented at said hearing that the parents' physical,
mental or emotional condition may be a factor in causing
the neglect, dependency or delinquency of the children.
Johnathan King, counsel for the parents,
objected to the administering of the psychological
examinations, T.4,L.20-22, and

ne~<

counsel for the

parents objected to the taking of the examinations, except
for the completion of the report already commenced by
Dr. Tomb, T.9,L.l8.24.

There was, therefore, no

consent or waiver by counsel, of the parents' right to
procedural due process under the statute.
The parties, individually, did not consent or
~aive

their rights to procedural due process under

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the statute in attending the psychological examinations
administered by Dr. Leibroder and Dr. Berensen.

The

parties were instructed to attend the examinations and
did what they were requested to do.

As to whether or

not the parents understood the effect of the request
for psychologicals, Ruby Jackson has a disability
which makes her unable to clearly understand instructions, even through an interpreter.

Dr. Berensen testi-

fied as follows with regard to Ruby Jackson:
Dr. Berensen:

The person I relied upon and
had to was the interpreter, and
she'sworked extensively with deaf
people, as I understand it, her
own parents were deaf, and I had
to rely upon her as a second,
you know, party to help me.
She didn't indicate that l1rs.
Jackson does not understand
concepts, but that her lack of
understanding is beyond what
she has seen in the congenitally
deaf, that there are other problems, is the way she put it, and
she agreed to keep rephrasing the
questions until she felt as though
Mrs. Jackson understood them or
else, she would say to me, "Sh~
does not understand that quest~on,
she's talking about something
else".
T.l37,L5-l5.

With regard to Marvin Jackson,

it is also clear

that he has difficulty in understanding.

Dr. Berensen

testified as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Dr. Berensen:

In my conclusion, my diagnostic
impression is that Mr. Jackson
would fit the category of
inadequate personality with
impulse disorder and a
borderline I.Q. ~.L.l2-l4.

If the parties were not handicapped with certain
learning disabilities, they would certainly be entitled
to all the protection the law affords with regard to the
procedural safeguards of 78-3a-23, U.C.A. annotated as
amended.

Since they are handicapped with certain learning

disabilities, the utmost care and concern should be taken
to see to it that their rights are fully protected.
The Court, in ordering the psychologicals of the
parents by Dr. Liebroder and Dr. Berensen, ignored the
three (3) important procedural safeguards of 78-Ja-23,
U.C.A. annotated as amended as follows:
l.

It directed the parents to submit to
psychological or psychiatric examinations
without concern for the due notice requirement of the statute.

2.

It directed that the parents submit to
psychological or psychiatric examinations
without regard for the statutory requirement of a hearing set for the specific
purpose of determining whether or not .
the parents' physical, mental, or emot~onal
condition mav be a factor in causing the
neglect, dep~ndency, or delinquency of the
child or children.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3.

It directed the parents to submit to
psychological or psychiatric examinations
without concern for the statutory mandate
that the Court make findings from the
evidence presented at a hearing that the
parents' physical, mental or emotional
condition may be a factor in causing the
neglect, dependency, or delinquency of the
child or children in question.

In reviewing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Order, which are based heavily on the testimony
of Dr. Berensen and the evidence introduced by Dr.
Liebroder, the Court should reverse the order of the
Juvenile Court which permanently terminated the rights of
the biological parents and ordered that the children be
placed for adoption, on the basis that the biological
parents were not afforded their right to procedural
due process in accordance with 78-3a-23, U.C.A.
annotated as amended, in a proceeding that resulted
in an order permanently depriving them of custody of
3 of their minor children and requiring that said
children be placed for adoption.

POINT II

THE MINOR CHILD. ROSE, ALTHOUGH ADOPTABLE, HAS
REACHED THE AGE AT HI-!ICH IT 1..10l'LD BE I:·POSSIBLE TO
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
- 9-may contain errors.

BREAK TIES WITH HER NATURAL PARENTS, AND IN KEEPING
WITH THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, THAT PART OF
THE ORDER THAT SHE BE PLACED FOR ADOPTION SHOULD BE
VACATED.
A.

BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF FACT.

In paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact, it is
observed:
Dr. Berensen, M.D., testified that in the
case of both Rose and Carol, it would be difficult,
in view of their ages, to break the ties with the
natural parents.
The order with regard to Carol was that she not
be placed for adoption and petitioners do not dispute
the order placing her in temporary foster care with the
opportunity to visit with petitioners.
1vith regard to Rose, however, the 10 year old
minor child of petitioners, any order of the Court
that the child be placed for adoption could not
sever the strong ties she has with her natural parents
and therefore, any attempt to place the child for
adoption, thereby terminating all parental rights and
responsibilities, would not be in keeping with this
important Finding of Fact and that part of the order
thatthe child be placed for adoption should be vacated.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology -10Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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B.

BASED ON THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

The conclusions of law ,.;ere such that the Court
concluded that adoption for Rose would be impossible
as follows:
Rose, although adoptable, has reached an
age at which it would be impossible to break
ties with her natural parents.
Therefore, the Court reached the conclusion that
the ties with the natural parents were too strong for
adoption to be a possibility and that part of the order
that Rose be placed for adoption is inconsistent with
the Conclusions of Law reached by the Court and should
therefore be reversed.
C.

THE STATE'S EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT ADOPTION

IS NOT A POSSIBILITY FOR ROSE.
Dr. Berensen testified as follows:
Mr. Oddone:

In terms of adoptability, would
you speak to that issue as it
relates to Rose?

Dr. Berensen:

I would rather say that Rose
has no psychiatric disabilities
in great number, one, two, she
shows great personality strengths
and ability to integrate into
another home.
Taken those three
factors into consideration, I
would sav that this child is
adoptabl~. given certain
modifications.

Hr. Oddone:

T.v'hat ·..;ould those modific2.tions 'Je?
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Dr. Berensen:

Those modifications are that Rose
has a heritage and that she needs
to be able to call upon that
heritage whenever she feels the
need for it, so that Rose should
always know that she has a set of
n~tu:a1 parents and a group of
s~bl~ngs and she may at times
need to see that family and
she should know, as she does
now and seems comfortable with
it, that her parents cared about
her, but that they were unable
to take care of her.

Mr. Oddone:

And you say she knows that now?

Dr. Berensen:

She knows now, according to the
Statement she made to me, "Mom
and dad couldn't take care of the
children" was the reason for her
placement and was comfortable
and accepting of that.
T.l30, 124-32; T.l41 Ll-10

If Rose were placed for adoption, under the law, she
would haven no right to see her natural parents.

In 78-30-11,

U.C.A. annotated as amended, a complete severing between
parent and child is dictated:
The natural parents of an
from the time of the adoption,
parental duties toward and all
the child so adopted and shall
rights over it.

adopted child are,
relieved of all
responsibility for
have no further

According to the testimony of Dr. Berensen, it is
verv important that Rose maintain her heritage and the
right to see her parents and siblings as she feels the

.
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need to do so.

Therefore, any final order Qust comply

with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the
evidence presented; and, as an order placing the child
for adoption is inconsistent therewith, that part of the
final order should be stricken.
D.

THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD SHOULD BE THE

PARAMOUNT CONCERN OF THE COURT.
In Taylor~- Waddoups 121 U.274,

241 P.2d 157

(1952), the Court observed that the best interests of
the child should be paramount in adoption matters.
In addition, in 78-30-9, U.C.A. the legislature has adopti.
the same policy as follows:
The Court must examine all persons appearing
before it pursuant to the preceding provisions,
each separately, and, if satisfied that the interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption,
it must make an order that the child shall thenceforth be re~arcrea: and treated in all respe~ts as
the child o the person adopting.
An attempt to create a fiction in the mind of a

ten year old girl that a new set of adoptive parents are
her biological parents is unreasonable and not possible
due to the fact that this ten year old girl knows and
needs the contact with her natural, biological parents
The reason for creating the fiction that soc.eone
other than the biological parents gave birth to the
child is

t~e

ass:..;.:::ption ~~-:a': :-:1os: 3do:-ti..c:;s ·.:c\_:.~-.: 'c;e
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those where the biological parent or parents place an
infant,not a fully developed child, for adoption, freely
and voluntarily; believing that it is best for the child.
Society seeks to protect the child from the hurt it would
suffer from knowledge of the fact that it had been given
away by its biological parents.
Does the reason for this fiction exist in the case
of a child who is loved and wanted by parents who,
nevertheless, cannot provide for her adequately; but
where the child is old enough to have established
some ties with the parents, such as in the case of ten
year old Rose?
Since the law of adoption proceeds on the basis that
an adopted child is the literal offspring of the adoptive
parents and all rights and responsibilities with the
biological parents are terminated on the date of adoption,
adoption is not in keeping with the best interests of
this ten year old child.
The child should continue to have the opportunity to
·;isit with her biological parents, as ordered by the trial
Court, and therefore an order doing ~ore than depriving
:~e parents of custody is inconsistent with the best

in:::c;rests of t:-;e child.
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An order placing the child for adoption cuts off
all rights of the child or the biological parents to
associate with each other, and thatpart of the final
order should, therefore, be vacated.

E.

PUNISHMENT OF THE PARENTS IN A PERMANENT

DEPRIVATION CASE SHOULD NOT BE THE PURPOSE OF THE
FINAL ORDER, BUT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD SHOULD
BE THE PRIMARY GOAL OF ANY SUCH ORDER.
In 1970 Utah Law Review 325 it is observed as
follows:

To sever all contact between the biological parents
and the child serves to punish the parents for their actic~.
or inaction, in fai:ing to adequately Qeet the needs
of their child.

It does not, however, meet the needs

of the child, and the order of adoption should be vacated
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POINT III
IF THE ORDER IS VALID WHICH PLACED ROSE FOR
ADOPTION YET AFFORDED HER THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE AND
ASSOCIATE WITH HER BIOLOGICAL PARENTS, AS SHE DESIRES,
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A VITAL LINK WITH HER HERITAGE; THEN
TO MAINTAIN THAT VITAL LINK FOR DOLLIE AND HAROLD, THEY
SHOULD BE AFFORDED TO BE AND ASSOCIATE WITH THOSE SAME
COMMON PARENTS.
A.

}~

ANDDOLLIE HAVE A RIGHT TO A SENSE OF

HERIAGE.
The Court should be concerned not with legal
niceties, but with the reality of what will occur if
the children are placed for adoption, yet are denied
all contact with their biological parents.

Under

Point I, appellants seek a complete reversal of the
order of the Juvenile Court and in Point II a reversal
of that part of the order requiring that Rose be
placed for adoption.

In the alternative, if the

Court determines that an order is valid which places
a child, rather than an infant, for adoption,
yet grants it the right to visit and associate with
its parents, as is the case with the order of the
Juvenile Court for Rose, t~en appellants seek to
obtain a like order with regard to Harold and Dollie.
Dr. Berensen aptly stated the concept when
she responded to a question about what the effect
an order would be on Carol and Rose if the parental
rights
not
terminated
as provided
follows:
Sponsored
by the S.J.were
Quinney Law
Library.
Funding for digitization
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Dr. Berensen:

I find that difficult to answer
be7aus7 I feel that the important
th~n
~s what ha
ens in realit
rat er than what is written
down on paper legally. P.l34, L. 13-li

Harold Jackson will be 6 years of age in November
and Dollie Ann Jackson will be 4 years of age on July

31, 1978.
Certainly these 2 children know that while in
foster care they are not with their biological
parents.

They will also know, when, and if, they

are placed for adoption, that the adoptive parents
are not their biological parents.
As they get older they will naturally want to
know more about their biological parents.

If they

desire contact with their biological parents, now
or in the future,

they have no right to make that

contact under the present order.
A child who can see for itself through face
to face contact with loving biological parents that,
as stated by Rose, they love

her but aren't able to

take care of her, can some how sort out and make
sense of the confusing set of facts which gave rise
to its having been taken from its biological parents
and placed for adoption in the horne of strangers.
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In an article by Nancy Kupersmith, "The Fight to
Open Up Adoption Records," June Reader's Digest, 27,
(1978), we are able to take a look into the adoptee's
feelings with regard to finding natural parents:

PERSONAL
Adult who was an adopted child desires
contact with other adoptees to exchange views
on adoptive situation and for mutual assistance
in search for natural parents.
--Classified ad in New York
Times, March 21, 1971
At the time she placed this ad, Florence
Fisher had just successfully completed a
20-year search for her natural mother.
Because adoption records are closed to adoptees·
in all states except Alabama and Kansas, those
two decades had been filled with frustration
and heartache. Her ad was an attempt to
reach other adoptees seeking to fill the
void that separates them from their past and
an effort to hel¥ them avoid the soul-wrenching
agony she had su fered.
Out of this vast mutual yearning, Fisher
created an organization that is helping
thousands of adoptees in the search for their
roots. Today, her Adoptees' Liberty Movement
Association (AU1A) is the largest organization
of its kind, with 10,000 members scattered
throughout the 50 states. ALMA's slogan: "The
truth of his origin is the birthright of every
::Jan. ti

By providing answers, encouragement and hope,
AL'1A is helping adootees gain Hhat evervone

else takes for granted: the sense of ~eritage
that answers the most basic and hauntlng or
human questions, "Who am I?"

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-18- OCR, may contain errors.

Without it, adoptee Pam Synge Hasegawa,
an ALMA member, claims she is like an island.
"I want to touch the mainland--to ask 'Who?
she says.
Anita HcCarthy, another ALHA
Why?
member, adds: "The real me lies frozen inside.
My children have only half of their heritage-their father's.
Is mine any less important
because I was adopted?"
Yet, little by little, legal opinion is
swinging toward the adoptee.
In February 1977,
in the most significant court decision so rar,
a New Jersey superior court forced an abption
agency to search for the natural parents; if
unsuccessful, the agency must give the records
to the adoptee, unless the state shows "good
cause" why he should not have them.
The reasons for placing the children permanentlyfor
adoption are not inconsistent with re~ular contact
with their biological parents and Harold and Dollie
should be permitted to visit and associate with their
natural parents, thereby maintaining a senseof heritage.
B.

THE ADOPTION STATUTES DO NOT SPECIFICALLY

PROHIBIT CONTACT BY A CHILD \HTH ITS BIOLOGICAL PARENTS.
The purpose of the Juvenile Court act is to
strengthen family ties whenever possible.

In 78-Ja-l,

U.C.A. annotated as amended it is observed:
It is the purpose of this act to secure
for each child corning before the juvenile
court such care, guidance and control, preferably
in his own horne, as Hill serve his 'Ne lfare and
strengthen family ties whenever possible; to
secure for anv child who is renoved from his
horne the care: guidance and discipline required
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to assist him to develop into a responsible
citizen, to improve the conditions and home
environment responsible for his delinquency;
and, at the same time to protect the community
and its individual citizens against juvenile
violence and juvenile law breaking. To this
end this act shall be liberally construed.
We are not here dealing with the placement of
infants for adoption, but with children who are ages
4 and 6 respectively and who, in reality, will not
believe that the adoptive parents are their natural
or biological parents and will have many questions
concerning their own heritage.
It is submitted that three adoption statutes
govern the relatinship between parent and child
and the natural or biological parents, as follows:
l.

In 78-30-9, U.C.A. annotated as amended
it provides:
The court must examine all persons
appearing before it pursuant to the preceding
provisions, each separately, and, if
satisfied that the interests of the child
will be promoted by the adoption, it must
make an order declaring that the child
shall thenceforth be regarded and treated
in all respects as the child of the person
adopting.

2.

In 78-30-10, U.C.A. annotated as amended
it provides:
A child when adopted may take the family
name of the person adopting. After adoption
the two shall sustain the legal rela~lon of
~arent and ch~ld, and have all the rlghts
~nd be subject to all the duties of that
relation.
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3.

In 78-30-11, U.C.A. annotated as amended
it provides:
The natural parents of an adopted
child are, from the time of the adoption,
relieved of all parental duties toward and
all responsibility for the child so
adopted, and shall have no further rights
over it.

None of the foregoing statutes state specifically
that the child shall be prohibited from being and
associating with its natural or biological parents.
Furthermore, these same statutes apply equally to the
case of an infant, a fully developed child or an
adult.

It is submitted that the intent of these

statutes is to sever the legal relationship and
rights and obligations between the biological parent
and the child but that there is no intent to create
in the mind of a child old enough to have established
ties with the natural parent a fiction in the mind
of said child that the adoptive parents are, by virtue
of the adoption decree, the biological parents of
the child.
It is submitted that since the children can
benefit by long term placement where there is no
chance for the child to be shifted from foster home
to foster home, or from a foster home back and forth
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between the biological parent and the foster home,
if the children were placed for adoption, the needs
of the children would be met; but to fully meet the
needs of the children, there should be a tie to
their heritage or biological parents and they should
be permitted and accorded every right to visit and
associate with their biological parents.

CONCLUSION

Appellants seek an order vacating the order of
the Juvenile Court which terminated all their parental
rights to Rose, Harold and Dollie.

In the alternative

they seek an order vacating that part of the
order with regard to Rose which ordered that she be
placed for adoption.

Finally, if the Court concludes

that the order depriving the parents of all parental
rights is valid and the order placing Rose for adoption,
yet affording her the right to visit with her natural
parents as she desires is also valid; then, appellants
seek an order that Harold and Dollie be accorded the
right to visit and associate with their biological parents.
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Respectfully submitted,
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